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Out in the Cold: The Combined Effects of NAFTA and the
MFA on the Caribbean Basin Textile Industry
Renee T. Legierski
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, when the Caribbean Basin's fate was of paramount
importance to the United States, U.S. officials vowed that such
concern would remain intact well into the 1990s.1 In 1992, how-
ever, the United States finalized the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 which has the potential to under-
mine the efforts of both the Caribbean Basin countries and the
United States in the economic and social development of the
Caribbean region.3 Aspects of the Uruguay Round of GATT4 ne-
gotiations portend a similar threat to Caribbean Basin
1. In 1986, a top U.S. official stated that the Caribbean Basin Initiative as
well as the fate of the Caribbean nations involved were important parts of U.S.
foreign policy, and that the United States would remain concerned throughout
the twelve year duration of the CBI. See Elliot Abrams, CBI and the U.S. Na-
tional Interest, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1986, at 9. The statement was made
before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means commit-
tee on February 25, 1986 when Mr. Abrams was the Assistant Secretary for In-
ter-American Affairs. Id. Mr. Abrams stated that this commitment would be
sustained "because it reflects the fundamental interests of this nation." Id. One
must question this "commitment," however, if the U.S. administration, through
NAFTA, dramatically undermines its entire effort in the Caribbean Region.
The same official who spoke of that "commitment" also stated that
"overbureaucratization is the death knell of initiative, investment, and growth."
Id. at 14.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the parties to which are
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, was completed on September 6, 1992
and was signed on December 17, 1992 by then U.S. President Bush, Canadian
Prime Minister Mulroney, and Mexican President Salinas. The agreement has
not yet been adopted. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Mexico-Canada, (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. As early as March 1992, a GATT study cautioned that a North Ameri-
can free trade agreement, such as the one that has been finalized, would have a
"far-reaching" adverse impact on other countries, and that the countries in the
Caribbean Basin would be the hardest hit. Peter Morton, GATT Slams Trade
Pact as Dangerous: North American Menace?, FIN. POST, Mar. 13, 1992, § 1, at 7.
The study predicted that NAFTA would divert trade from Caribbean nations
through its improvement in trading conditions for Mexico. Id.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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countries.5
The textile and apparel manufacturing industries are very
important to the Caribbean Basin, despite their exclusion from
regional trade agreements.6 These industries now face a double
threat. Under NAFTA, Mexican textile producers will ulti-
mately be free to import their goods into the U.S. market with-
out the burden of tariff or non-tariff trade barriers.7 In addition,
the Uruguay Round agreement will likely dismantle the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement (MFA)8 and will further magnify the disad-
vantage to Caribbean Basin producersY The MFA system of
quotas has protected the Caribbean Basin textile industries in
the past, and its dismantling, combined with exclusion from
NAFTA, could spell the end of the textile industry in that
region.
This Note argues that in addition to creating a policy con-
flict in the Caribbean Basin, NAFTA continues a long tradition
of protectionism in the textile industry.'0 This Note examines
5. Caribbean Industry Fearful U.S. Proposal for Global Quotas Will Un-
dermine Progress, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 793 (June 6, 1990).
6. Impact of CBI on U.S. Economy Is Minimal, ITC Says, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1533 (Oct. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Impact of CBI Act].
7. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Annex 300-B.
8. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, BISD 21st
Supp. 3 (1974), extended by Protocols of 1977, 1981 and 1986, BISD 24th Supp. 5
(1976-77), BISD 28th Supp. 3 (1980-81), BISD 33d Supp. 7 (1985-86) [hereinafter
MFA].
9. Caribbean Industries Fearful US. Proposal for Global Quotas Will Un-
dermine Progress, supra note 5.
10. In addition to the impact predicted for Caribbean economies, imple-
mentation of NAFTA has created a rash of protectionist sentiment in Asia, evi-
denced by the creation of the Asian Free Trade Area. See An Asian Free Trade
Area and the NAFTA May Complement Each Other, Zoellick Says, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1288 (July 29, 1992) [hereinafter An Asian Free Trade Area and
NAFTA].
Asian countries responded to fears of protectionism by launching the Asian
Free Trade Area (AFTA) in September 1992. Id. AFTA's goal is to reduce tar-
iffs on goods traded among member countries to a maximum of five percent.
Members expect to complete implementation within the next 15 years. Id.
Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun initiated the idea of the AFrA and
urged a possible association between AFTA and NAFTA within the framework
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC). Id.
A similar suggestion had been advanced by a top U.S. State Department
official in July 1992. Nothing further has developed, however. Id.
A proposal has also been sponsored by Malaysia for a similar free trade
grouping that would exclude North America, the East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC). Leah Makabenta, Trade: NAFTA Casts Pall over Asia-Pacific Group-
ing, Inter Press Service, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File. While initially countries such as Japan were not receptive to such
an idea for fear of antagonizing the United States, Japanese government, after
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the possible effects of NAFTA's textile provisions on the Carib-
bean Basin textile industry under the existing provisions of the
MFA, and also considers what may happen if and when the
MFA is dismantled. Part I provides a brief background of the
Caribbean Basin countries and their economies. Part II dis-
cusses the protectionist history of the textile industry leading to
the creation of the MFA, as well as subsequent ametidments to
the MFA and its current status. Part III explores the objectives
and textile provisions of NAFTA. Part IV analyzes the effects
of NAFTA on textiles, with and without the MFA, and the con-
troversies to be faced in either event. Part V examines possible
solutions to the problems trade displacement and policy conflict
in the Caribbean Basin if NAFTA is ratified, and concludes that
the only realistic solution is to allow Caribbean Basin countries
into the NAFTA.
I. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was originally imple-
mented in 1983 under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act." At that time, the Caribbean Basin was in an economic
crisis.12 U.S. interest in the stability of the region provided the
impetus for the Initiative;13 Congress cited deeply rooted struc-
NAFTA, appeared to be warming to the idea, and Britain stated it had no objec-
tions to such an arrangement. Id The United States may want to give more
serious consideration to committing to some kind of trade alliance with Asian
nations to avoid being effectively shut out of the region.
11. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF STATE, CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIA-
TIVE 1 (Harriet Culley ed., Mar. 1987).
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (Supp. II 1990)).
12. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1983).
13. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 9.
Although the CBI was established to help Caribbean countries, it has actu-
ally provided a greater advantage to Asian textile manufacturers than to those
in the Caribbean Basin. See Far East Investment in Central America Increases,
Spurred on by US. Incentives, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1615 (Nov. 6, 1991).
Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have increased their invest-
ment in Central America threefold since 1986. Id. The increased investment is
said to be driven by increased wages in Asian countries and U.S. quotas on Pa-
cific Rim products, in addition to duty-free or reduced-quota treatment given to
certain products coming into the United States from the Caribbean Basin under
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Id. For example, South Korea
increased investment in Central America to the tune of 140 industries and the
exportation of $150 million in goods a year to the United States. Id As of 1991,
South Korea was the second-largest investor in Honduras, with more than 30
textile plants and plans to increase investment more than $10 million, up to $30
million per year, in 1992. Id. Business leaders from Pacific Rim countries antic-
ipate similar benefits from the NAFTA. Id.
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tural problems, huge balance of payment deficits, high unem-
ployment, and declining growth as some of the causes of this
economic crisis.14 The United States sought the initiative to sta-
bilize the political, social and economic sectors through a pro-
gram which would reduce tariffs on goods exported to the
United States and increase investment in Caribbean countries. 15
Since its implementation, however, it has become clear that the
CBI has not been as advantageous to Caribbean Basin countries
as was originally intended.16 The CBI allows certain products to
enter the United States on a tariff-free basis from Caribbean Ba-
sin countries. 17 One of the reasons for the CBI's lack of success,
however, is that many products are excepted from U.S. duty-free
treatment.'8 Although textiles and apparel are among the goods
excluded from the CBI,19 these industries are exceedingly im-
portant to the CBI countries. Nearly fifty percent of total U.S.
imports from CBI countries are textiles, clothing, footwear and
leather goods.20
II. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historically, domestic textile industries in developed coun-
tries have continually received protection from producers in de-
veloping countries.2 ' The developing countries' success in the
textile industry because of their ability to manufacture textiles
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM. PUB. No. 2326, Review of Trade and In-
vestment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United
States-Mexican Relations, Phase II: Summary of Views on Prospects for Future
United States-Mexican Relations, (Oct. 1990), reprinted in 3 WORLD TRADE
MATERIALS, 43, 81 (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter USITC, Prospects for Future]. Fac-
tors inhibiting CBI success were listed as transportation difficulties, lack of
economies of scale, and infrastructure inadequacies. Id.
Even though total customs inspection rates are high, only two percent of all
goods entering the United States from CBI countries are inspected by customs
officials. Customs Cannot Ensure Item 807A Compliance Despite High Rate of
Inspection, GAO Finds, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 452 (Apr. 12, 1989). The total
rate of customs inspections of all imported goods is eighteen percent.
17. New 50 Percent Value Rule of Origin Urged to Clarify, Stabilize CBI
Program Benefits, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 109 (Jan. 23, 1991).
18. USITC, Prospects for Future, supra note 16.
19. See Impact of CBI Act supra note 6, at 1533.
20. NAFTA Impacts on CBI, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: Caribbean (Latin
Am. Newsletter, Ltd.,) June 18, 1992, at 7.
21. See generally DONALD B. KEESING & MARTIN WOLF, TEXTILE QUOTAS
AGAINST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1980).
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less expensively than developed countries resulted in the latter's
need for such protection.22 The textile industry has been partic-
ularly successful in Asian and other third world countries for
two reasons. First, the industry is labor intensive, particularly
with respect to apparel manufacturing.2 3 Developing countries
have had large numbers of workers willing to work long hours
at low wages.M Second, in countries which traditionally have
not had excess capital to invest, the industry has been relatively
easy to launch.25
In the 1950s and 1960s, developing countries became more
economically efficient than industrialized countries in the tex-
tile and apparel industries.26 As a result, industrialized coun-
tries applied greater political pressure to restrain imports in
these industries.2 This pressure first led to voluntary bilateral
restraints by the lesser developed exporting countries.28 When
this system proved unsatisfactory in equalizing competition in
the textile and apparel sectors, the developed countries sought a
more formal arrangement.2
B. THE SHORT TERM ARRANGEMENT
In 1959, a GATT working party was formed to study "mar-
ket disruption," an occurrence brought about within the econo-
mies of industrialized countries by surges of large numbers of
lower-priced cotton textiles.30 The working party recommended
22. Id at 10.
23. Id. at 10, 163.
24. Id. at L2.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. Id.
Several nations, including the United Kingdom in 1954, had used the "es-
cape clause" provisions in the GATT to restrain trade in the textile area. Gary
H. Perlow, The Multilateral Supervision of International Trade: Has the Tex-
tiles Ezperiment Worked?, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 94-96 (1981). The United
States, having recently invoked this procedure in another area of trade, felt it
could not do so at that time. Id.
28. Perlow, supra note 27, at 95.
Japan led this movement toward voluntary restraints by exporting coun-
tries, which in the middle 1950s to early 1960s, imposed internal restrictions on
cotton textile exports to the United States. KEESING & WOLF, supra note 21, at
14-16. Japan was considered to be the major threat to industrialized nations
because its textile exports in 1962 stood at $915 million, in addition to $211 mil-
lion in clothing exports. See id. at 13. Textile imports from developing coun-
tries at the same time totaled less than $900 million combined. Id
29. KEESING & WOLF, supra note 21, at 14-22.
30. See Perlow, supra note 27, at 96-97; see also KLEESING & WOLF, supra
note 21, at 19-20. The term "market disruption" was defined by the GATT
1993]
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that market disruption be recognized as a damaging phenome-
non, that the situation called for the orderly expansion of trade
through a multilateral approach, and that the status of legal
rights under GATT be left unaffected.31 Additional discussions
led to the Short Term Arrangement which was effective from
October 1961 until September 1962,32 and allowed interim re-
strictions on imports of cotton textiles for a period of one year
where market disruption occurred. Long-term arrangement ne-
gotiations were pending.33 In February 1962, the Short Term
Arrangement was succeeded by the Long Term Arrangement,
which, by several extensions, was effective through 1974.34
C. THE LONG TERM ARRANGEMENT
The Long Term Arrangement, which preceded the MFA,
provided a means of both justifying and controlling the use of
restrictive trade measures on cotton textiles.35 Exporters were
to be given a gradually increased share of the market in ex-
change for accepting export limits which would prevent a faster
growth rate which developed countries labeled disruptive.36 De-
veloped countries believed that they were justified in demanding
the restrictive measures.37 Exporters accepted the arrangement
because they had little choice; without the arrangement, devel-
oped countries would have implemented the tightest possible re-
strictions.38 Although the Long Term Arrangement was called a
temporary measure, it was renewed several times, and eventu-
ally expanded into the MFA.39
CONTRACTING PARTIES to include "(i) a sharp and substantial increase of
particular products from particular sources, where (ii) the products in question
are offered at prices substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of
comparable quality in the market of the importing country and (iii) there is
'serious injury' to domestic producers or threat thereof." Id. at 19.
31. See Perlow, supra note 27, at 96.
32. Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, BISD
10th Supp. 18 (1961); see also Perlow, supra note 27, at 97-98.
33. KEESING & WoLF, supra note 21, at 16.
34. Id. Long Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cot-
ton Textiles, 11th Supp. 25 (1962), extended by Protocols of May 1, 1967 and
June 15, 1970, BISD 15th Supp. 56 (1966-67), BISD 18th Supp. 18 (1970-71); see
Perlow, supra note 27, at 97.
35. See KEESING & WoLF, supra note 21, at 19-20.
36. See id. at 20.
37. Id. at 18
38. See id. at 19-22.
39. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 2:305
CARIBBEAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND NAFTA
D. THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Tex-
tiles, better known as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA),
protects textile and clothing producers and manufacturers in in-
dustrialized countries from competition with imports from de-
veloping countries.40 It is an expanded version of the Long
Term Arrangement, covering not only cotton textiles but also
textiles produced from many other fibers.4' The MFA was con-
cluded in 1974 and was originally structured, as was the Long
Term Arrangement, to facilitate trade liberalization over time.42
The stated objectives of the MFA were expansion of trade, re-
duction of trade barriers and progressive liberalization of trade
in textiles, as well as ensuring an "orderly and equitable devel-
opment" of trade and avoidance of market disruption in both im-
porting and exporting countries.43
Countries were assigned quotas based on import levels dur-
ing the years preceding the agreement.44 After the first year,
the quotas were to be increased by not less than six percent per
year.45 In addition, quotas were transferable between categories,
and could be carried over or carried forward from one year to
the next.46 The MFA created a Textiles Surveillance Body
(TSB) to make recommendations concerning any measures or
actions which a participating country believed were contrary to
its interests.47 The TSB is composed of a balanced membership
of importing and exporting countries and an impartial
chairperson.48
The major provisions of the MFA are Articles 2, 3, and 4.49
Under Article 2, trade restraints already in force must be either
justified under GATT, made to conform to the MFA provisions,
or eliminated.5 0
Article 3 allows an importing country to temporarily re-
strain 5' imports when it believes that it is suffering from market
40. Id. at ix.
41. I& at 39-40.
42. I&
43. MFA, supra note 8, at art. 1(2).
44. KEESING & WOLF, supra note 21, at 41.
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id at 42.
48. Id
49. Perlow, supra note 27, at 101.
50. Id
51. Restraints are not to exceed one year. Extensions, however, are easily
obtained. MFA, supra note 8, at art. 3(8); see also Perlow, supra note 27, at 101.
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disruption.52 A determination of market disruption is based on
damage, or threat thereof, to domestic producers caused by "a
sharp and substantial rise in volume from particular sources,"
and "prices, which are substantially below prevailing market
prices. '5 3 Actual damage is determined by factors "bearing on
the evolution of the state of the industry in question .... ,54 The
complaining country must first request consultations with the
importing country; if no agreement is reached within sixty days,
the importing country may impose unilateral restraints.5
Article 4 sanctions voluntary export restraints and bilateral
agreements, provided that they are more liberal than Article 3
restraints.5 Under Article 4(2), agreements are permitted if
their goal is to eliminate real risks of market disruption;57 actual
market disruption is not a prerequisite.m
In its current form, the MFA exists as a series of bilateral
restraint agreements between major textile exporting countries
and importing countries. 59 GATT negotiations in the Tokyo
Round cemented tariff protection of apparel because while cuts
were made in other areas of trade, tariffs on apparel remained
virtually the same.6°
Beginning in 1977, the initial trade liberalizing devices were
chipped away by negotiations between the European Commu-
nity and developing countries which cut quotas below levels
achieved earlier.61 The goal of the European Community and
many of the smaller developed countries was to change the rules
of the MFA so that developing countries would be forced into a
52. Perlow, supra note 27, at 101.
53. Id. at 101 n.38.
54. MFA, supra note 8, at Annex A. These factors include turnover, mar-
ket share, profits, performance, employment, volume of disruptive and other
imports, production, utilization of capacity, productivity and investments. Id
See also Perlow, supra note 27, at 101 n.38.
55. MFA, supra note 8, at art. 3(5)(i). In addition, if serious market disrup-
tion is considered likely to occur, it is possible to impose trade restraints prior to
and during consultations. Id at art. 3(6).
56. See Perlow, supra note 27, at 102.
57. Id. The term "real risk" is not defined. See MFA, supra note 8, at art.
4(2).
58. MFA, supra note 8, at art. 4(2).
59. William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administra-
tive Decisions Affecting International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response,
99 YALE L.J. 669, 673 n.29 (1989).
60. KEESING & WoLF, supra note 21, at 70-71. Small cuts were made in
textiles and clothing; however, where they exist, tariffs on clothing will remain
higher than on any other industrial product. Id.
61. Id. at ix-x.
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sharp cutback of overall export growth.62 The result was a re-
strictive and complicated set of quotas imposed by many devel-
oped countries upon textile exports from developing countries.63
Developing countries are determined to see the MFA dis-
mantled.64 The dismantling of the MFA was a matter of great
dispute on the Uruguay Round agenda.6 The Uruguay Round
talks did reach a tentative agreement on a plan to phase out the
MFA,66 but the talks eventually stalled. The MFA was ex-
tended for the fifth time6 7 until the end of 1993. If the Uruguay
Round is completed, however, it is expected that the MFA will
be dismantled.
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT
NAFTA,68 finalized on August 12, 1992 between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada, has been hailed by some as "the be-
ginning of a new economic course," 69 and by others, sarcasti-
cally, as "a big American dream. '' 70 NAFTA will create the
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id. at 60-70.
64. NICHOLAS HOPKINSON, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND PROSPECTS FOR
WORLD TRADE 23 (1990).
65. See GATT Extends Textile Agreement for One Year, Reuter Libr. Rep.
(Dec. 9, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omi File. GATT negotia-
tors have been unable to agree on penalties for unfair competition once the
MFA is dismantled. Id. This disagreement led to the GATT's Committee on
Textiles decision to extend the Agreement for another year. Id.
66. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20,1991)
§ 0.1 -0.36 (available from the office of the United States Trade Representative)
for the proposed plans to eliminate the MFA.
67. See Textiles: GATT Extends Multi-Fibre Arrangement For Another 12
Months, Multinational Serv., National and Regional Contents, No. 0327, § III
(Dec. 16, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
68. NAFTA, supra note 2.
69. Mark Vaughan, Give NAFTA Its Due, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May
18, 1992, at 18. Vaughan believes that NAFTA could mark a new economic
course by shifting the focus of the United States from its traditional East/West
stance to one that is more regional. Id. The author believes NAFTA could help
"redefine" the role of the United States and could be an important move toward
a Western Hemisphere Economic Community. Id.
70. Kelly McParland, Building a Fortress: Asian Apparel Firms Fear Fall-
out from NAFTA, FIN. POST, Sept. 14, 1992, § 1, at 9. The author quotes Chan
Kee-wing, the managing director of an Asian apparel manufacturing company.
I& Chan feels that the agreement does not promote free trade, but instead cre-
ates protectionism by making North America self-sufficient. Id. Chan also
thinks that U.S. officials's expectations regarding NAFTA's results are wrong,
because he believes more factories will be moving out of North America than in.
Id.
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world's largest trading area with a combined gross product of 6.2
trillion U.S. dollars and a consumer market of 366 million peo-
ple.71 In 1993, the three member countries are expected to dis-
cuss ratification of NAFTA. The overarching purpose of
NAFTA is to further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooper-
ation.72 The objectives of the agreement include the elimination
of trade barriers, promotion of fair competition, increased oppor-
tunities in investment, and the provision for adequate protection
of intellectual property rights.73 Because the agreement pro-
vides for gradual reduction of tariffs in many areas, the total ef-
fect of NAFTA will not be felt for many years.74
NAFTA's basic objective is the progressive elimination of
all tariffs on goods which qualify as North American goods
under rules of origin provisions. 75 The textile provisions of
NAFTA provide for strict rules of origin.76 Textile or apparel
goods must be produced from yarn or fiber made in a NAFTA
country.77 These provisions are called the "yarn forward" and
"fiber forward" rules of origin.78 Yarns, apparel and fabrics
made in North America that do not meet the rules of origin for
textiles are still eligible to qualify for preferential duty treat-
ment up to certain import levels.79
In the area of textiles, NAFTA trumps the MFA and other
71. The European Community and the European Free Trade Area cur-
rently involve 360 million people and a combined gross national product of 5.9
trillion U.S. dollars. North America: Enterprise for the Americas, LATIN FIN.,
Mar. 27, 1991, at 36, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
72. Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States and the United
States of America, Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement 1 (Aug. 12, 1992) (available from the office of the United States
Trade Representative).
73. Id.
74. See generally id, see also, James M. Sheehan, The Free-Trade Case
Against NAFTA, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1992, at 19.
75. Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 72, at 2.
76. NAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 300-B.
77. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 404; see also Description of the Proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 72, at 7.
78. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 404; see also Description of the Proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 72, at 7.
79. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at app. 6.0, § B(1); see also Description of the
Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 72, at 7. Prefer-
ential treatment is also provided for material cut and sewn from certain im-
ported fabrics which are in short supply such as silks, linens and certain
shirting fabrics. Id.
The Agreement also provides for a committee to recommend suggestions
for implementation of uniform labelling requirements. NAFTA, supra note 2,
at annex 300-B, § 8. This will eliminate unnecessary obstacles to textile trade
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agreements concluded between NAFTA countries.8 0 Under
NAFTA there will be no quotas on goods entering the United
States or Canada from Mexico. Customs duties on textile goods
will be eliminated immediately or phased out over a maximum
period of ten years.8 1
While NAFTA on its face appears only to promote free
trade by creating a free trade area for its member countries,
nonmember countries fear that it will create a protectionist bar-
rier to free trade, and that it will divert trade from the Carib-
bean and Asian regions to Mexico.8 2 The Caribbean Basin
countries' concern over their textile industries is well-founded8s
Although NAFTA has been billed as a "free" trade arrange-
ment, it greatly distorts trade.84 Determining the impact of
these distortive effects is contingent upon whether or not the
MFA is dismantled.
resulting from different labelling requirements used in each of the three coun-
tries. Id.
80. NAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 300-B, § 1(2); see also Key Areas of
Trade Agreemen FIN. POST, Aug. 13, 1992, § 1, at 12.
81. NAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 300-B, § 2(1); see also Key Areas of
Trade Agreemen supra note 80, at 12.
The Agreement also provides for the implementation of safeguards, during
a transition period, for goods in the textile and apparel industries which produ-
cers feel may face serious damage due to increased imports from other mem-
bers. Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 72, at 6.
Safeguards may take the form of an increase in tariffs on such goods, or, in
trade to or from Mexico, imposition of quotas on imports. NAFTA, supra note
2, at annex 300-B, § 4. Such safeguards may not be in place for a period exceed-
ing three years, or have effect beyond the transition period, without consent of
the Party against whose goods the action was taken. Id.
82. McParland, supra note 70, at 9.
83. Caribbean nations are not alone in their fear of the effects of NAFTA.
Asian apparel firms fear they will be forced to move manufacturing plants to
Mexico to compete for their share of the textile market. Id.
The Asian nations' greatest fear is that Mexican competition, free from the
import quotas that plague Asian nations, will erode their share of the United
States market. Makabenta, supra note 10.
United States trade in the Pacific region is more than $300 billion a year;
forty percent greater than the United States' trans-Atlantic trade. An Asian
Free Trade Area and NAFTA, supra note 10, at 1288.
From the angle of imports in textiles, there is no question of Asian domi-
nance for U.S. trade. McParland, supra note 70, at 9. Exports from China alone
accounted for ninety percent of textile products imported by the United States
in the first quarter of 1992. Id. Fifty-one percent of Hong Kong's clothing ex-
ports in 1991 went to the United States and Canada combined, with a value of
more than $21 billion. Id.
84. See generally Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protection-
ist Devices: Rules of Origin (Sept. 1992) (unpublished paper on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). For example, in implementing trade bar-
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IV. NAFTA WITH AND WITHOUT THE MFA
The textile industry with, and without, the MFA presents
two very different pictures. The relative efficiency of the produ-
cers involved will determine whether and how well they will
survive. An illustration of the positions of the parties in terms
of their relative efficiency in the textile field should help clarify
the ramifications of the MFA and NAFTA on the textile
industry.
On a scale of efficiency, Asian and third world countries
such as India are the most efficient producers of apparel prod-
ucts, followed by Mexico under NAFTA, Caribbean Basin coun-
tries, and finally the United States, which is the least efficient
producer.85 Assume the MFA and NAFTA are both in place.
riers a fundamental concept is that the higher the requirements for local con-
tent in goods, the more trade from importing nations is displaced. Id.
Most of the local content requirements on goods included in NAFTA are
high, but those relating to textiles are virtually exclusive. See supra notes 76-79
and accompanying text; see also Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, NAFTA and the
Rest of the World; in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT
210, 224-25 (Nora Lustig et al. eds., 1992).
Contrary to promoting free trade, the textile provisions of NAFTA will
eventually serve to displace Asian and CBI importing manufacturers, because
foreign producers obviously cannot meet such strict rules of origin. See U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm Pub. 2353, The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free
Trade Agreement with Mexico, Feb. 1991, cited in 1 GATlT TRADE POLICY RE-
VIEW, United States 49 (1992).
This also causes tariff escalation, which means that the cost of using foreign
yarn or textiles results in a higher tariff for the entire product. For example,
under NAFTA, if a Mexican manufacturer uses U.S.-produced textiles to make
a product, no duty will be charged upon entry of the good into the United
States. In contrast, if the same manufacturer uses foreign textiles to manufac-
ture even a portion of the product, the entire product is charged the twenty
percent tariff upon entry into the United States. The savings in the cost of the
textiles from the foreign manufacturer must be at least the cost of the U.S.
tariff for the Mexican manufacturer to justify use of foreign textiles. The
United States thus has a captive market in Mexico because under NAFTA, no
one else can sell textiles for manufacture into apparel to Mexico as inexpen-
sively as the United States. See generally Textile Industry Leader Advocates
NAFTA Approach over Uruguay Round Trade Proposal PR Newswire, Oct. 1,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Joanna Ramey, ITC Asked
to Weigh End of MFA in NAFTA Probe, 164 WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY 17, (Nov. 20,
1992).
Additionally, Mexico is guaranteed tariff-free entry of its textile goods into
the United States. NAFTA, supra note 2, at annex-300B.
The U.S. export market for U.S. suppliers will expand because of the prob-
able shift of production from the Far East to Mexico. USITC, Prospects for Fu-
ture, supra note 16, at 50.
85. The author derives this ranking from the following sources. ITC Re-
port Explores Ramifications of NAFTA on CBERA Apparel Producers, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1337 (Aug. 5, 1992) [hereinafter ITC Report Explores]; Carib-
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The average U.S. tariff on apparel is between seventeen and
twenty-two percent.s6 For the sake of convenience, this model
will use twenty percent as the average U.S. tariff. Assume the
original cost of the textiles used to make an apparel product is 25
monetary units (mu) for all producers. Assume also that U.S.
production costs equal 75mu, CBI costs equal 45mu, Mexican
costs equal 35mu, and Asian costs equal 25mu. Mexican apparel
under NAFTA could enter the United States at a cost of 60mu,
because no tariff will be imposed on its goods under NAFTA.
Caribbean Basin goods will enter at a cost of 70mu plus the
twenty percent U.S. tariff, for a total entry cost of 84mu. The
gap between Caribbean and Mexican producers will be greater
than it was before NAFTA, when Caribbean goods entered at
84mu, and Mexican goods at 72mu. Asian goods could enter at a
total entry cost of 60mu. While Caribbean goods will still have a
competitive cost advantage over U.S. goods, whose cost stands at
100mu, Caribbean producers are at a distinct disadvantage to
Mexican and Asian manufacturers. As a result of the twenty
percent preference for Mexican goods under NAFTA, Mexican
goods can compete equally with Asian goods, and can be sold
more cheaply than both Caribbean and U.S. goods.
A. NAFTA wiTH = MFA
Because the MFA has been extended until the end of 1993,87
Mexico under NAFTA is offered an open U.S. market, without
the burden of quotas or the twenty percent tariff on apparel.
Other importing countries will continue to have MFA quotas
and pay a twenty percent duty. As long as the quotas exist and
restrain the most efficient Asian and other third world suppli-
ers, there will probably continue to be room in the U.S. market
for relatively less efficient Caribbean Basin countries. While
quota-free Mexican production might eventually expand enough
to crowd out Caribbean Basin producers, this is not an immedi-
ate threat.
New industry, however, is likely to invest in Mexico, rather
than the Caribbean countries because with no quotas and a
twenty percent tariff advantage, Mexico is obviously the location
bean Industry Fearful U.S. Proposal for Global Quotas Will Undermine Pro-
gress, supra note 5, at 793; Impact of CBI Act on U.S. Economy Is Minimal,
supra note 6, at 1533; McParland, supra note 70, at 9.
86. See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., USITC Publication 2567, HAR-
MONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (1993).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
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with the greatest growth potential. This structure accomplishes
the goal of NAFTA in developing Mexican industry and enhanc-
ing its competitiveness.88 In this situation, Caribbean textile in-
dustries may survive, but are unlikely to grow. Indeed, over the
long run they will probably decline. A report issued by the In-
ternational Trade Commission found that NAFTA provides
large incentives for Asian manufacturing plants which are now
located in Caribbean Basin countries to shift locations to Mex-
ico.8 9 Thus, the picture for Caribbean Basin countries only looks
worse if the MFA is dismantled.
B. NAFTA wiTHOUT THE MFA
The harm to the Caribbean Basin countries by dismantling
the MFA could be significant. The textile industry there has
grown around, and as a result of, the complicated system of quo-
tas which comprises the MFA.9° As Asian and third world pro-
ducers filled their own quotas in the U.S. market, their search
for regions with unfilled quotas led them to build the textile in-
dustry in the Caribbean region.91 The textile industry now com-
prises an important part of the Caribbean Basin economic
system, and may not be able to survive without the assistance of
distortive trade measures such as the MFA. 92
With no system of guaranteed quotas in place, CBI countries
will be forced to compete for a piece of the U.S. market. 93 Coun-
tries such as India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and China are much
more efficient producers of textiles and apparel than are CBI
countries.4 The dismantling of the MFA will give countries
such as China the chance to compete freely in the U.S. market.
Whatever the eventual market for imports, countries such as
China are likely to take the whole market once they are re-
leased from MFA quotas.95
88. Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 72, at 1.
89. Prospects for Future, supra note 16, at 81. See also, ITC Report Ex-
plores, supra note 85, at 1337.
90. Caribbean Industry Fearful U.S. Proposal for Global Quotas Will Un-
dermine Progress, supra note 5, at 793.
91. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
92. Caribbean Industry Fearful U.S. Proposal for Global Quotas Will Un-
dermine Progress, supra note 5, at 793.
93. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 85.
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. See generally China May Dominate World Textile Market as MFA
Ends, US. Industry Officials Say, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1844 (Dec. 19, 1991);
Textile Association Leader Challenges President to Demonstrate Support for
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Once quotas are eliminated, U.S. prices will decrease as U.S.
manufacturers are forced to compete for market share with the
more efficient producers. U.S. and Caribbean Basin manufac-
turers will be the first to be eliminated from the market because
their prices will remain the highest.96 Only the most efficient of
the U.S. manufacturers will survive. Once the MFA is disman-
tled, Caribbean Basin producers are less likely to become effi-
cient enough to survive, and their ability to compete in the U.S.
market will be neutralized by NAFTA. Optimistically, less effi-
cient U.S. producers can be absorbed into the U.S. economy and
job market, 97 however, Caribbean workers will have nowhere to
go. Caribbean Basin economies depend upon apparel manufac-
turing. 98 The diverse job market that exists for U.S. workers is
simply absent in Caribbean countries.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The best solution from a world textile trade perspective, but
perhaps the most difficult, is for the United States, Canada, and
Mexico to fail to ratify NAFTA and to conclude the GATT nego-
tiations by dismantling the MFA. Although this is the most ben-
eficial solution in terms of the world textile trade, to Caribbean
Basin countries, it is the most damaging. This solution would,
for the first time in decades, liberate trade in textiles and pro-
vide for a more efficient allocation of world resources. Those
who can produce textiles most efficiently and inexpensively
would be able to sell them on the world market on a trade-bar-
rier-free basis. Undoubtedly, this is not an easy solution for ap-
parel workers in countries where apparel cannot be produced
US. Jobs and Industry, PR Newswire, Apr. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
96. See supra text accompanying note 85.
97. Trade experts have stated that the best thing for U.S. trade would be
for textile industry workers to let lower-paying textile jobs go to developing
countries like Mexico. See Joyce Barrett, U.S. Study Hits Textile Industry Ac-
tion, 66 WEEKLY HOME FURNISHINGS NEWSPAPER 90 (Apr. 6, 1992). In their
opinion, retraining U.S. workers for higher-paying jobs is a better, more effi-
cient way of conducting trade and allocating world production resources, as well
as promoting development and industry in developing countries which need it.
Id. A study completed by the Congressional Budget Office was done at the re-
quest of the House Subcommittee on Trade. The study, "Trade Restraints and
the Competitive Status of the Textile, Apparel and Nonrubber-Footwear Indus-
tries," recommended that the U.S. textile and apparel industries retrain work-
ers for higher-paying jobs and let lower-paying jobs go to workers in developing
countries. Id. U.S. textile and apparel industry workers and representatives,
however, have not responded positively to this suggestion. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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efficiently and inexpensively. Realistically, it will probably
never happen. U.S. apparel workers, for example, have lobbied
strongly for protectionist measures in favor of their industry,
and this trend is likely to continue.99
A more pragmatic solution is to allow Caribbean Basin
countries into NAFTA prior to the dismantling of the MFA.1° °
Inclusion in NAFTA could minimize damage caused as a result
of a dismantled MFA. CBI countries' requests for parity with
NAFTA's market access provisions, however, have been met
with neither enthusiasm nor action by the United States. Public
and private sector representatives from Caribbean Basin coun-
tries lobbied for inclusion in NAFTA as early as September of
1991,101 but response from U.S. officials has been cool. 10 2 The
United States has said that it will consider Caribbean Basin
Countries' entry into NAFTA in four or five years. 10 3 Because it
will take several years to dismantle the MFA, if it is in fact ever
dismantled, Caribbean countries have a window of time to con-
vince U.S. officials to allow them entry into NAFTA.
If the United States is concerned about the Caribbean Basin
as it has stated in the past,104 and as it should be, then inclusion
of Caribbean countries into NAFTA is the only remaining realis-
tic solution. Caribbean countries can only benefit from inclu-
sion; without it, their textile industries will not survive because
they are less efficient than either their Asian or Mexican coun-
terparts.10 5 With the MFA dismantled, the Caribbean countries
would at least have the protection of NAFTA. Without the sup-
99. See USITC, Prospects for Future, supra note 16, at 111; Joanna Ramey
& Joyce Barrett, Protests Planned Against NAFTA's Signing Today: North
American Free Trade Agreement, 164 WOMEN'S WEAR DAiLY 2 (Dec. 17, 1992).
100. USITC, Prospects for Future, supra note 16, at 81. In addition to CBI
nations' entry into NAFTA, there are three other proposals to mitigate damage
to Caribbean industries and economies. Id First, it is suggested that Mexico be
required to open its market to Caribbean Basin products either on a tariff-free
basis or on the same basis under which they enter the U.S. Id. Second, that
rules of origin under NAFTA permit Caribbean goods to be treated as if they
were Mexican in origin. Id. Third, that Mexico allow Caribbean nations to ship
goods freely through Mexico. Id.
101. See Latin American, Caribbean Producers Seek Increased Access to U.S.
Markets, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1356 (Sept. 18, 1991).
102. Small Nations Fear Bush Enterprise Initiative, Mexico FTA May Dim
Their Economic Prospects, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1892 (Dec. 12, 1990).
103. Canute James, Mexican Meat Could Be Caribbean Poison - Canute
James On Concerns that Mexico's Presence in NAFTA Will Undermine the Re-
gion's Economies, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at 3.
104. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
105. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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port of NAFTA and a dismantled MFA, however, their indus-
tries cannot hope to compete.
CONCLUSION
Caribbean Basin countries' apparel manufacturers will be
seriously disadvantaged in the U.S. market if NAFTA is con-
cluded. This disadvantage will be more pronounced and imme-
diate if the MFA is dismantled. However, even if the MFA is
not dismantled, Caribbean Basin countries are still likely to lose
market share and new investment to Mexico under NAFTA.
Inclusion of Caribbean countries in NAFTA is a realistic
and effective solution. It would be beneficial to the Caribbean
countries and responsible foreign policy on the part of the
United States. The United States once voiced concern for the
Caribbean Basin. It remains an area that needs United States
assistance to grow and prosper. It is the most logical solution to
a problem in an industry in which trade becomes more compli-
cated every day. It seems that in the textile field, the more free
trade agreements that are concluded, the more complicated the
picture, and the less free the trade.
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